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 Abstract 
Through case-law research, this paper critically assesses the compatibility of the 
Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA) subscriber appeal process provisions 
(Section 13 of the DEA) with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). Drawing on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
case-law, Ofcom’s Initial Obligations Code (the Code), and the DEA judicial 
review decision, namely, BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for 
Business Innovation and Skills and others, this paper focuses on the three 
Strasbourg Court principles of equality of arms, admissibility of evidence, and 
presumption of innocence in an effort to determine whether Section 13 of the 
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DEA infringe them, and whether this constitutes a breach of a subscriber’s right 
to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. The paper examines these three ECtHR 
principles. It contrasts such principles with the Code’s provisions, and considers 
the compatibility of Section 13 of the DEA with Article 6 ECHR. It concludes 
that the DEA subscriber appeal process provisions do indeed infringe these 
principles, thus constituting a violation of subscribers’ right to a fair trial. It also 
recommends that the UK government start taking seriously human rights in 
general, and Article 6 ECHR in particular. 
 
Keywords: Digital Economy Act 2010; Article 6 ECHR: right to a fair trial; 
copyright; file-sharing  
 
Paper: 
INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY ACT 2010 SUBSCRIBER APPEAL 
PROCESS PROVISIONS WITH ARTICLE 6 OF THE ECHR 
  
Introduction 
The Digital Economy Act (DEA) imposes two initial obligations on Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs): first, to notify subscribers of their alleged illegal file-
sharing based on evidence collected by investigatory agents’ monitoring 
software and recorded in Copyright Infringement Reports (CIRs); and, second, 
to retain Copyright Infringement Lists (CILs) of alleged repeat infringers, thus 
allowing rightholders to take targeted legal action.1 Additionally, the DEA 
provides for further technical obligations. These require ISPs to implement 
technical measures (e.g., broadband throttling, blocking access and temporary 
suspension) against certain infringers.2  
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The DEA process can be divided into four steps: (i) an infringement is detected; 
(ii) the ISP notifies the subscriber; (iii) after paying a £20 fee, the subscriber can 
rely on four grounds to appeal each warning letter and each CIR included in the 
warning letter; and, (iv) the appeals body resolves the appeal.3 Article 6(1) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states that ‘in the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing’.4 This Article is equally 
applicable to civil and criminal proceedings. However, Article 6(2) 
(presumption of innocence) and (3) (criminal charges) only apply to criminal 
proceedings. Both terms: ‘civil rights and obligations’ and ‘criminal charges’, 
are autonomous; i.e., the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) will 
determine into which of these terms proceedings fall.5 
  
For the civil head of Article 6 of the ECHR to apply there must be a ‘dispute’ 
over a ‘right’ or ‘obligation’.6 The DEA states that a copyright infringement 
dispute is a dispute between rightholders and ISPs concerning an obligation or 
Ofcom’s Initial Obligations Code (the Code).7 Furthermore, that ‘right’ must be 
based on domestic legislation,8 namely, Sections 7(9)9 and 12(4)10 of the DEA. 
Finally, that right or obligation must be ‘civil’ in nature,11 such as the right to 
compensation12 (Section 13(7)(b)13 of the DEA). If all these conditions are met, 
the civil head of Article 6 applies.  
 
In Engel and others v the Netherlands, the ECtHR employed a three-step test for 
assessing the applicability of the criminal head of Article 6 of the ECHR.14 This 
involves the non-cumulative presence of any of the three following elements:15 
first, classification of an alleged offence in the national legislation as penal; 
second, nature of the offence; and third, nature and degree of severity of the 
sanction.16 The Code indicates that CILs allow rightholders to target ‘any 
litigation’ against alleged repeat infringers.17 Thus, this would also cover 
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criminal cases. Accordingly, the criminal head of Article 6 also applies. A 
number of specific elements of Article 6 ECHR have emerged from the 
Strasbourg Court’s case-law, such as, procedural equality, an adversarial 
process, disclosure of evidence, a reasoned decision, appearance in person, and 
effective participation.18 Given that the DEA grounds of appeal are relevant to 
equality of arms,19 admissibility of evidence20 and presumption of innocence,21 
this paper will focus on these three ECtHR principles in an effort to determine 
whether the subscriber appeal process provisions (Section 13 of the DEA) 
infringe them, and whether this constitutes a breach of a subscriber’s right to a 
fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. As will be shown through case-law 
research, Section 13 of the DEA could certainly contravene these principles, 
thus constituting a violation of subscribers’ Article 6 ECHR rights. The paper is 
divided into 3 sections, which examine each of the ECtHR principles in turn. 
The paper concludes that under Article 6 of the ECHR, the DEA subscriber 
appeal process provisions do indeed infringe these principles, thus constituting a 
violation of subscribers’ right to a fair trial.  
 
ECtHR principle of equality of arms  
The Strasbourg Court’s case-law has confirmed that the principle of equality of 
arms is an element of the wider notion of a fair trial within the meaning of 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The ECtHR has noted that this principle requires 
there to be a fair balance between claimants and defendants, that is to say, each 
participant must be provided with a reasonable opportunity to argue their case 
under conditions which do not put them at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis 
their adversary.22 In other words, it essentially requires procedural equality 
before the law between all parties.23 As will be discussed, the equality of arms 
rule is based on a consideraton of three fundamental principles, namely: 
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equipage equality, rule equality and outcome equality.24 Section 13 of the DEA 
allows a subscriber to appeal on the following grounds: 
(a) the alleged contravention to which a CIR relates was not a contravention 
of copyright; 
(b) the CIR was not associated with the subscriber’s IP address at the time of 
the alleged contravention; 
(c) the alleged contravention to which the CIR relates was not made by the 
subscriber, and that he took ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent others 
contravening copyright through the connection; or 
(d) either a rightholder or an ISP contravened the Code.25 
Although omitted from the Code, the UK government considers that 
‘reasonable steps’ may include: (i) using Wi-Fi passwords; (ii) imposing 
controls on routers and browsers; (iii) installing parental control software; (iv) 
blocking websites by genre; (v) blocking P2P traffic; (vi) blocking website 
addresses; and (vii) using proxy servers.26 
 
The Code had previously established that subscribers could appeal on ‘any other 
ground’ to show the non-exhaustive character of the listed grounds of appeal.27 
However, rightholders objected that the grounds of appeal should only be 
included in the DEA and not on ‘any other ground’; on the instruction of the 
UK government, Ofcom removed such grounds.28 Moreover, Ofcom also 
eliminated the previous DEA requirement that it should take into consideration 
the subscribers’ technical knowledge and their ability to control access to the 
internet connection.29  
 
Ofcom also amended the provision about oral hearings, as it believed that this 
issue was better addressed within the procedural rules of the appeals body.30 
However, Ofcom has stressed that due to costs, it would not expect the appeals 
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body’s procedural rules to require an oral hearing.31 In this context, two points 
are worth remembering: first, the Code indicates that the adoption of a Technical 
Obligations Code by the Secretary of State, including ‘a right of appeal’ to the 
First-tier Tribunal, namely, a judicial body, would require further secondary 
legislation;32 second, section 13(10)(a) of the DEA states that the Technical 
Obligations Code must allow a decision of a subscriber appeal to be appealed to 
the First-tier Tribunal, on various grounds including ‘an error of fact, wrong in 
law or unreasonable’.33  
 
Interestingly, the impact of Section 13 of the DEA was expressly addressed in 
the DEA judicial review decision of BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of 
State for Business Innovation and Skills and others.34 Parker J observed that the 
DEA’s ‘chilling’ effect potentially arose because the subscriber was not 
necessarily the copyright offender, yet it was the subscriber who was exposed to 
any CIR or CIL.35 He noted that it was easy to understand that, for instance, Wi-
Fi providers, such as libraries and cybercafes, would wish to avoid the danger of 
receiving CIRs, of being a potential target for litigation and of having to prove 
that they had taken reasonable steps to prevent infringement.36 He explained 
that some businesses and public intermediaries offered ‘open’ Wi-Fi access to 
their customers.37 Moreover, the High Court elaborated that subscribers might 
take preventive measures that indeed exceeded what was necessary to exonerate 
them from liability.38 However, as will be discussed, the Court appears to have 
omitted potentially relevant legal information, i.e., Article 6 ECHR.  
 
Shipman argues that the assessment of procedural inequality is a matter of 
degree, i.e., the test is whether the parties suffer a substantial disadvantage vis-
à-vis their opponents and, if so, the trial was unfair and there is no cause for 
assessing the justifiability, or else, of the state rejection.39 As she recognizes, 
this means that claimants and defendants must be equally equipped and 
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procedural rules should be enforced in an even-handed way.40 This concept of 
equality of arms is based on three fundamental principles:  
 equipage equality: a real fight between equally-armed adversaries;41 
 rule equality: a commitment to give opponents similar procedural 
opportunities;42 and, 
 outcome equality: cases with similar facts should achieve similar 
results.43  
It will now be considered how the Code could infringe the ECtHR’s principle of 
equality of arms under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.  
 
 
In terms of the first principle: equipage equality, in Dombo Beheer BV v the 
Netherlands, the ECtHR observed that under Article 6(1) ECHR, each 
participant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to argue their case under 
conditions which did not put them at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their 
adversary.44 As noted above, the Code states that CILs allow rightholders to 
target ‘any litigation’ (e.g., Norwich Pharmacal45 orders) against alleged repeat 
infringers.46 To put it differently, it seems arguable that it gives them the 
opportunity to obtain a court order for disclosure; argue their case not only in 
civil, but also criminal proceedings; and also take advantage of technical 
measures. However, Ofcom removed the requirement that the appeals body 
should bear in mind the subscribers’ technical knowledge and their ability to 
control access to the connection47 but, strikingly, also the possibility to appeal on 
‘any other ground’.48 Worryingly, this is at odds with the Advocate General’s 
(AG) opinion in Promusicae v Telefonica de Espana SAU (see paragraphs 
[114], [115]).49 The problem is made even worse by the fact that, unlike Section 
13 of the DEA, a scheme such as the US Copyright Alert System offers 
subscribers more opportunities to prepare their defence and challenge CIRs on 
the following grounds: 
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(i) misidentification of account50  
(ii) unauthorized use of account51  
(iii) authorization52  
(iv) fair use53 
(v) misidentification of file54  
(vi) work published before 192355  
Thus, since rightholders and subscribers are not equally-armed adversaries, a 
possible objection might be that Section 13 could infringe the ECtHR’s 
principle of equality of arms under Article 6(1) ECHR. 
 
With regard to the second principle: rule equality, in Pelladoah v the 
Netherlands, the ECtHR noted that the principle of equality of arms contained 
within Article 6 ECHR also required that the defendant’s arguments be heard as 
much as possible together with those of the claimants.56 This was supported by 
the ECtHR in Ekbatani v Sweden when it found that where the appeal court had 
to decide the guilt or innocence of an accused, an oral hearing was indeed 
necessary.57 This can be contrasted with Ofcom’s statement that, in practice, it 
would not expect the appeals body’s procedural rules to require an oral 
hearing.58 It is worth noting that the Explanatory Notes indicate that if technical 
obligations are adopted, the person hearing subscriber appeals can validate, 
invalidate or change the introduction of a technical measure.59 Moreover, as 
discussed earlier, the Code states that the adoption of a Technical Obligations 
Code by the Secretary of State, including ‘a right of appeal’ to the First-tier 
Tribunal, namely, a judicial body, would require further secondary legislation.60 
To further exacerbate the problem, Section 13(10)(a) of the DEA adds that the 
Technical Obligations Code must allow appeals to the First-tier Tribunal on 
various grounds including ‘an error of fact, wrong in law or unreasonable’.61 
Therefore, given that under the Initial Obligations Code, in contrast to the 
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Technical Obligations Code, the First-tier Tribunal (that is to say, a judicial 
body) is not required to decide subscribers’ guilt or innocence, a case can be 
made that Section 13 of the DEA could infringe the ECtHR’s principle of 
equality of arms under Article 6(1) ECHR.  
 
As to the third principle: outcome equality, in Borgers v Belgium, the 
Strasbourg Court mentioned that the simple appearance of inequality in the 
accused’s rights sufficed to violate Article 6(1) of the Convention.62 As 
discussed above, one of the grounds of appeal is that the contravention was not 
made by the subscriber and that he took ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent it.63 
Although strangely omitted from the Code, such ‘reasonable steps’ include 
using Wi-Fi passwords.64 It is true that, like the wording of Section 13 of the 
DEA, in Promusicae v Telefonica de Espana SAU the AG recognized that it did 
not necessarily follow from the fact that copyright had been violated under an 
IP address, that such actions were performed by the subscriber. Other 
individuals could have used the PC or connection, even without his knowledge 
(e.g., due to inadequate wireless security or hacked networks).65 However, it can 
be contended that, under the DEA, cases with similar facts will never achieve 
similar results. This is all the more so because in Golden Eye (International) 
Limited and others v Telefonica UK Limited Arnold J highlighted that even if 
investigatory agents’ monitoring software worked properly and the ISP 
accurately detected the subscriber, it was not possible to compute an overall 
expected rate of mistaken detection.66 More alarmingly, however, he found that 
‘all that can be said with certainty is that there will be an unknown percentage 
of errors’.67 Thus, since cases with similar facts are unlikely to achieve similar 
results, it is debatable whether Section 13 could contravene the ECtHR’s 
principle of equality of arms under Article 6(1) ECHR.  
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ECtHR principle of admissibility of evidence  
The Strasbourg Court has recognised that whilst Article 6 of the ECHR 
guarantees the right to a fair trial, it does not specify any requirements for the 
admissibility of evidence per se, which is an issue for regulation under domestic 
law. The ECtHR has explained that it was not its task to decide, in principle, 
whether specific types of evidence such as illegally acquired evidence, might be 
admissible; or, indeed, whether the claimant is culpable or not. It stated that the 
question was whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which 
the information was acquired was fair.68 In Schenk v Switzerland,69 the Court set 
out some guiding principles to determine whether the overall trial was fair. 
Section 13 of the DEA does not satisfy the principles set out in Schenk v 
Switzerland.70 With that in mind, this Section will argue that it violates the 
ECtHR’s principle of admissibility of evidence and it will do this by referring to 
the Code and BT Plc and Talk Talk Telecom Group Plc v Secretary of State for 
Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others.71 
 
To begin with, in terms of ensuring the reliability of rightholders evidence-
gathering techniques, it has to be mentioned that the Code states that a 
rightholder might just send a CIR if it has collected information which provides 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that either a subscriber has contravened the 
holder’s copyright, or the subscriber has allowed another individual to do so and 
such an individual has contravened the holder’s copyright.72  
 
However, when considering the compatibility of Section 13 with the ECtHR’s 
principle of admissibility of evidence under Article 6(1) of the Convention, it is 
important to point out that the Code refers to the following DEA conditions:  
• the subscriber must be able to appeal on the grounds that the apparent 
contravention with which a CIR is associated is not a contravention of 
copyright; and,  
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• the appeals body has to decide an appeal in favour of the subscriber if the 
rightholder is unable to demonstrate that there had been a contravention 
of copyright.73 
 
In order to assess and authorize the rightholders’ data collection techniques, 
Ofcom proposes to promote the creation of an evidence-gathering technical 
standard.74 In particular, Ofcom expects that the introduction of this standard 
would address concerns raised by the Motion Picture Association (MPA), which 
expressed a desire to see other rightholders adopt information-gathering 
methods ‘as robust as their own’.75 However, when considering whether Section 
13 of the DEA could infringe the ECtHR’s principle of admissibility of 
evidence, the key point to remember is that some stakeholders propose that an 
accreditation system introduces a ‘rebuttable presumption’ on appeal, that the 
rightholders evidence is accurate.76 Thus, the Code explains that it is possible 
that this presumption will evolve over time if there are a number of cases from 
the appeals body establishing that evidence collected according to the approved 
methodologies ‘discharges the burden of proof’ on rightholders in an appeal.77  
 
Another relevant point which deserves attention is that following an instruction 
from the UK government, Ofcom removed the requirement for rightholders and 
ISPs to provide a statement demonstrating how their systems and procedures 
complied with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).78 Although left 
unmentioned in the Code, it has to be noted that Article 8(1) of Directive 
95/46/EC as a general rule prohibits the processing of sensitive personal data.79 
However, in assessing the compatibility of Section 13 with the ECtHR’s 
principle of admissibility of evidence, the important thing to understand is that 
the above is not applicable where the processing is necessary for the 
establishment, exercise, or defence of legal claims, as set out in Article 
8(2)(e).80 In the UK, the corresponding exemption is contained within DPA 
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Schedule 3, paragraph 6(c). It prohibits such processing unless it is necessary 
for the purposes of establishing, exercising or defending legal rights.81 
 
Notably, the scope of Directive 95/46/EC was expressly considered in the DEA 
judicial review appeal decision of BT Plc and Talk Talk Telecom Group Plc v 
Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others.82 The 
Court of Appeal agreed with Parker J that the processing of ‘personal’ and 
‘special data’ by rightholders fell within the exception in Article 8(2)(e).83 The 
Court observed that ‘that would appear to be the precise purpose of the … DEA: 
the copyright owner will be able, through … the DEA, to establish not only that 
there has been an infringement but also who is responsible for the 
infringement’.84 It elaborated that ‘the processing is plainly necessary for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims even if the beneficial 
consequence of the sending of a notification … will be that in the majority of 
cases the infringing activity ceases and no further action is required’.85 
However, a different conclusion could be drawn from the European Data 
Protection Supervisor’s (EDPS) opinion. 
 
In Schenk v Switzerland,86 the ECtHR set out some guiding principles that could 
be used to determine whether under Article 6(1) of the Convention the overall 
trial could be considered to be fair. The ECtHR applied the same principles in 
Peck and JH v the United Kingdom87 and Khan v the United Kingdom88. These 
principles were: the rights of the defence cannot be disregarded;89 the defence 
must have the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence;90 and 
there cannot be just one source of evidence on which the conviction is based.91 
It is worth noting, however, that the failure of one principle does not necessarily 
mean that there is an automatic violation of Article 6(1); the question is whether 
the proceedings are fair as a whole.  
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In terms of the first principle: the rights of the defence cannot be disregarded,92 
Ofcom eliminated the need under the DEA for rightholders to provide a 
statement demonstrating how their systems and procedures complied with the 
DPA.93 However, one can argue that this is a rather alarming decision as the 
EDPS recognizes that, taken together, both Article 6(c) and Article 8 of 
Directive 95/46/EC require that investigatory agents’ monitoring of software 
processing of subscribers’ IP addresses be restricted to what is ‘adequate, 
relevant and not excessive’.94 Strikingly, at odds with BT Plc and Talk Talk 
Telecom Group Plc v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport 
and others above, the EDPS notes that subscriber IP address processing can 
only be performed in the context of ‘specific’, existing or future court 
proceedings to establish, pursue, or defend legal claims.95 This is a view shared 
by Kokott in her discussion of Promusicae v Telefonica de Espana SAU96. The 
AG corroborated that the foreseeability requirement found specific expression 
in data protection law in the principle of purpose limitation, i.e., Article 6(1)(b) 
of Directive 95/46/EC. Accordingly, as she emphasized, pursuant to that 
principle, subscribers’ IP addresses should only be collected ‘for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes’.97 Thus, since Section 13 of the DEA does not 
require that subscriber IP address processing be only conducted in specific, 
existing or future court proceedings, it might be objected that this could infringe 
the ECtHR’s principle of admissibility of evidence under Article 6(1) ECHR.  
 
As far as the second principle outlined in Schenk v Switzerland is concerned, the 
ECtHR elaborated that Mr Schenk was also given the opportunity to challenge 
the authenticity of the evidence.98 As discussed before, the Code indicates that in 
order to challenge the CIR’s authenticity, the subscriber must be able to appeal 
on the grounds that the supposed contravention was not a contravention of 
copyright.99 Problematically, however, the Code completely fails to address, 
much less acknowledge, that in assessing whether there was a copyright 
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violation, subscribers should certainly be entitled to rely on fair dealing and 
public domain defences to challenge the CIRs’ authenticity, that is to say, the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA). This can be exemplified by 
file-sharing cases of non-commercial research, private study, criticism, review 
or reporting of current events.100 As noted earlier, under the US Copyright Alert 
System, subscribers are entitled to fair use and work published before 1923 
defences to challenge the authenticity of CIRs.101 Indeed, it is worth stressing 
that in Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM and SABAM v Netlog NV the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that whether a P2P communication 
was legitimate also depended on its impact on exceptions to copyright, public 
domain content and free material.102 Therefore, as Section 13 does not give 
subscribers the opportunity to rely on fair dealing and public domain defences 
to challenge the CIRs’ authenticity, it is debatable whether it could infringe the 
ECtHR’s principle of admissibility of evidence under Article 6(1) ECHR.  
 
The third principle found in Schenk v Switzerland asserted that a phone 
conversation recording should not be the only evidence upon which a 
conviction could be based.103 As outlined above, the Code states that the 
evidence-gathering technical standard would help rightholders to adopt 
information-gathering methods ‘as robust as’ those used by the MPA.104 
However, a counter-argument could run that even MPA evidence is not strong 
enough. Although left unmentioned in the Code, the agent who investigates 
copyright infringement claims on the MPA’s behalf is MarkMonitor/DtecNet. 
In November 2012, Friedberg reviewed MarkMonitor evidence and found that 
in order to perform the verification process for music (unlike films), 
MarkMonitor employed digital fingerprint-based technology to detect the first 
example of an identified title, and match each following edition of such title by 
hash value.105 The use of such technology is certainly objectionable when 
considering Clayton’s revelation that automated content recognition services 
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(e.g., Audible Magic’s fingerprinting technology) can make patently wrong 
decisions, as recently happened with the blocking of streamed video of the 
Hugo Awards.106 Indeed, this finding is entirely consistent with L'Oréal SA and 
others v eBay International AG and others where the CJEU confirmed that 
‘notifications of allegedly illegal activities or information may turn out to be 
insufficiently precise or inadequately substantiated’.107 As discussed before, the 
Code envisages the disturbing prospect of adopting a presumption of accuracy 
of CIRs in the future.108 Thus, as MarkMonitor CIRs would be the only 
evidence on which subscriber sanctions were based, again arguably, under 
Article 6(1) ECHR, Section 13 could contravene the ECtHR’s principle of 
admissibility of evidence. 
 
ECtHR principle of presumption of innocence 
The last issue to be addressed in this paper is whether Section 13 of the DEA 
could violate the Strasbourg Court’s principle of presumption of innocence. 
Article 6(2) of the Convention states that everyone charged with a penal offence 
must be presumed innocent until proven culpable according to law. The Court’s 
case-law has noted that this requires, among other things, that when performing 
their obligations, the courts should not begin with the preconceived opinion that 
the defendant has committed the alleged wrongdoing, i.e., the burden of proof 
lies with the prosecution and the accused has the benefit of doubt.109 In 
Salabiaku v France, the ECtHR explained that, in principle, under the ECHR 
the burden of proof could shift to the accused. However, it set forth a three-
pronged test to determine the compatibility of these reverse onus provisions 
with the Convention.110 Thus, in Section III it will be argued that under Article 
6(2) ECHR, Section 13 could contravene the ECtHR’s principle of presumption 
of innocence as it fails to satisfy the three-pronged test found in Salabiaku v 
France.111 This will be done by considering the Code and BT PLC and Talk Talk 
PLC v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and others.112  
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The Code states that ISPs have called for greater clarity about the DEA 
subscriber appeal process provisions.113 For example, BT argues that, as there 
needs to be an initial finding that can be appealed, ‘subscriber appeals’ are 
adjudications and not appeals, i.e., allegations by rightholders against 
subscribers.114 Similarly, BT, TalkTalk, Telefonica O2 and ISPA have claimed 
that the onus should be on rightholders to demonstrate that the subscriber 
themselves contravened copyright, and not on subscribers.115 However, what is 
relevant to the ECtHR’s principle of presumption of innocence is Ofcom’s 
conclusion. Notably it is at odds with the ISPs above; the Code stresses that the 
DEA is ‘clear’ that the burden of proof lies with both the rightholder and ISP to 
prove that a copyright contravention occurred and that it related to the 
subscriber’s IP address.116 
 
The Code indicates that a rightholder may only send a CIR if it has collected 
information which provides ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that:  
• a subscriber has contravened the holder’s copyright; or,  
• the subscriber has allowed another individual to do so and such individual 
has contravened the holder’s copyright.117  
However, importantly, Ofcom notes that it cannot require a higher standard of 
proof since, under the DEA, the right of a rightholder to submit a CIR is 
triggered if it ‘appears to a copyright owner’ that a copyright contravention took 
place.118 It adds that the UK government’s intention was that a rightholder 
would not need to establish ‘definitively’ that online copyright infringement 
occurred before sending a CIR.119  
 
The Code also states that, on receipt of a CIR from a rightholder, the ISP must 
identify the subscriber to which the IP address detailed in the CIR related to at 
the time of the alleged contravention.120 Accordingly, to ensure that the 
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procedure of linking IP addresses to subscribers is robust and accurate, the Code 
explains that ISPs should, before sending their first warning letter, give Ofcom a 
quality assurance report.121 Of particular relevance here is that, reacting to 
users’ concerns, the Code states that Ofcom suggests sponsoring the 
development of an IP address matching standard by an independent body.122 
However, in assessing the compatibility of Section 13 of the DEA with the 
ECtHR’s principle of presumption of innocence, the key thing to remember is 
that Ofcom concludes that ‘this standard would not be mandatory’.123  
 
Interestingly, the DEA’s burden of proof was explicitly considered in the DEA 
judicial review decision in BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for 
Business Innovation and Skills and others.124 Parker J noted that the ISPs claim 
that subscribers could see themselves exposed to CIRs or CILs, even if they 
were not the offender, unless they could demonstrate that they had taken 
‘reasonable measures’ to prevent it.125 He observed that such a burden was 
likely to prevent subscribers from permitting others (e.g., within the same 
household) to access the PC or the web.126 However, he explained that this was 
‘not an unreasonable burden’ to put on subscribers if it encouraged stronger 
copyright protection.127 Furthermore, he elaborated that the rightholder, 
following a Norwich Pharmacal128 order, must show that the subscriber had 
‘authorised’ the contravention which is a relatively high standard in civil 
litigations.129 However, as will be seen, Parker J’s reliance on individual 
inferences instead of evidence, namely, the ECtHR’s case-law, may have led to 
an oversimplification.   
 
Loveless points out that the leading Strasbourg Court judgement on reverse 
onus provisions is Salabiaku v France.130 Here, the Court noted that the 
Convention did not preclude presumptions of fact or law. However, regarding 
criminal law, it employed a three-pronged test to determine the compatibility of 
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these provisions with Article 6(2) ECHR.131 Specifically, it required member 
states to: remain within reasonable limits; take into consideration the 
importance of what was at risk; and, protect the rights of the accused.132 As 
discussed earlier, the Code indicates that CILs allow rightholders to target ‘any 
litigation’ against alleged repeat infringers.133 Thus, despite Parker J’s finding 
above, this would also cover criminal cases.  
 
In applying the test’s first prong, the ECtHR initially observed that for reverse 
onus provisions to be compatible with Article 6(2) of the ECHR, member states 
must remain within reasonable limits.134 As outlined above, the Code indicates 
that the evidence collected by investigatory agents’ monitoring software must 
provide reasonable grounds to believe that a subscriber infringed copyright or 
that he allowed another individual to do so.135 However, it is concerning that the 
AG in Promusicae v Telefonica de Espana SAU cautioned that, unlike ‘state 
authorities’, i.e., the courts or the data protection supervisory authorities, 
rightholders should never be allowed to use ‘unlimited’ infringement detection 
methods.136 Indeed, this is fully in accordance with the EDPS’s opinion which 
remarks that monitoring is particularly invasive of users’ privacy rights when it 
is not limited in scope, in time and in respect of individuals affected.137 
Specifically, the EDPS understands that under Article 8 of Directive 95/46/EC, 
monitoring can only be conducted in the context of specific, existing or future 
court proceedings.138 He adds that random monitoring concerning not-for-profit, 
minor, small-scale infringement is disproportionate and violates Article 8 
ECHR.139 Interestingly, Friedberg’s report reveals that MarkMonitor’s DtecNet 
software not only provides ‘continuous and consistent scanning’,140 but also that 
it creates a log of every user sharing or downloading the material.141 Thus, since 
MarkMonitor is neither limited in scope (e.g., specific, existing or future court 
proceedings); nor in time (e.g., at certain times of the day); nor in the number of 
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monitored users (e.g., only commercial scale infringers) common sense dictates 
that Section 13 could infringe the ECtHR’s principle of presumption of 
innocence under Article 6(2) ECHR. 
 
In applying the second prong of the test, the ECtHR noted that for reverse onus 
clauses to comply with Article 6(2) ECHR, member states also had to take into 
account the importance of what was at stake.142 As discussed before, Ofcom 
states that it cannot require a higher standard of proof since the right of a 
rightholder to submit a CIR is triggered if it ‘appears’ that copyright 
infringement took place.143 However, one could refute this by saying that the 
DEA standard is set below accepted levels. Crucially, in Bonnier Audio and 
others AB v Perfect Communication Sweden AB, the CJEU held that, in striking 
a fair balance between copyright enforcement and subscribers’ right to personal 
data protection, ‘clear evidence’ of infringement was vital.144 Moreover, the 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Code once more completely 
overlooks the fact that considerable care needs to be taken with rightholder 
monitoring. This is all the more so because the EDPS emphasizes that the 
‘unnoticed’ monitoring by investigatory agents would impact on millions of 
subscribers and ‘all’ users, regardless of whether they are under suspicion.145 In 
this context, in S and Marper v the United Kingdom the ECtHR found that ‘the 
risk of stigmatisation’ was particularly concerning; in other words, that 
individuals who had not been charged with any crime and were entitled to be 
presumed innocent, were being treated in the same way as convicted 
individuals.146 Therefore, since Section 13 of the DEA puts subscribers at 
serious risk of stigmatisation, it is arguable that it could infringe the ECtHR’s 
principle of presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) ECHR. 
 
With regard to the third prong of the test, the Strasbourg Court elaborated that 
for reverse onus provisions to be compliant with Article 6(2) of the Convention, 
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member states also had to protect the rights of the defence.147 As noted above, 
the Code underlines that the IP address matching standard ‘would not be 
mandatory’.148 Arguably, however, it should be. Clayton warns that, in order to 
prevent problems during the process of linking IP addresses to subscribers, ISPs 
also need to be careful with the technical details149 (see Golden Eye 
(International) Limited and others v Telefonica UK Limited [103]150). He 
explains that if an incorrect timestamp is utilized, even one that is only several 
seconds out, then a wrong IP matching might be performed of the previous or 
next subscriber that is dynamically assigned the specific IP address.151 Indeed, 
this is exactly what happened in EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd and others v the 
Data Protection Commissioner.152 Charleton J observed that in October 2010, 
all clocks across Europe were moved back one hour for winter, however, when 
Eircom, Ireland’s largest ISP, disregarded the time change, mistaken 
notifications were sent to 391 innocent subscribers.153 If one were to apply the 
daylight saving time issue to the six ISPs covered by the Code,154 this could 
become a huge problem since in the UK it is estimated that there are 
approximately 6.5 million file-sharers.155 Thus, given that Section 13 of the 
DEA fails to safeguard the right of subscribers to be presumed innocent, a case 
can be made that it could contravene the ECtHR’s principle of presumption of 
innocence under Article 6(2) ECHR. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
Through case-law research, this paper has examined the compatibility of the 
DEA subscriber appeal process provisions (Section 13 of the DEA) with Article 
6 ECHR. In terms of Article 6 of the Convention the most important and 
original contribution of this paper is that Section 13 could infringe the ECtHR’s 
principles of equality of arms, admissibility of evidence and presumption of 
innocence, thus constituting a violation of subscribers’ right to a fair trial. 
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Therefore, given the UK government’s blatant disregard for human rights in 
general, and Article 6 of the ECHR in particular, it should not surprise anyone 
that Ofcom itself has warned that there is potential for collective action to 
boycott the DEA process.156 Ofcom recognizes that a malicious campaign of 
collective appeals could potentially defeat the appeals system. In fact, as Ofcom 
notes, if a pressure group effectively convinced subscribers to appeal every 
warning, it remains unclear whether the appeals body could handle the 
volume.157 Perhaps, the time has come for the UK government to start taking 
human rights seriously. In my opinion, this situation is indeed alarming because 
violating minimum standards of protection guaranteed by the Convention in the 
name of fighting online copyright infringement due to unlawful peer-to-peer 
file-sharing is becoming common. Ultimately, unless something is done, and 
done fast, it could become so widely accepted that sadly it might not matter 
anymore. At that point, as Liberty anticipates, the enactment of pieces of 
legislation such as the DEA will mean that traditional civil or criminal law 
processes are sidestepped and replaced with administrative regulation controlled 
by the government that lacks procedural fairness.158 Even if the issue of 
subscribers’ rights being violated under Article 6 of the ECHR is set aside, the 
question remains as to whether implementation of Section 13 of the DEA is 
really worth the cost. Ofcom has stated that if at least three million CIRs are 
submitted by rightholders to ISPs in the first year, generating one million 
warning letters to subscribers, and if only 2.5% of the CIRs and warning letters 
are appealed at an average processing cost of £400 each, then the annual cost of 
the appeals process could easily exceed £40 million.159 As Ofcom indicates, it 
would constitute by far the greatest cost element of enforcing the DEA’s online 
copyright infringement provisions.160 In practice, if the UK government began 
taking the Convention seriously, Section 13 would also begin complying with 
EU law, namely, Article 1(3)a of Directive 2002/21/EC. This requires that 
measures taken by member states concerning subscribers’ access to, or use of, 
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internet facilities should be imposed only if they are ‘appropriate, proportionate 
and necessary’, and their implementation is subject to minimum procedural 
safeguards in accordance with the ECHR and basic EU law principles, including 
due respect for the right to privacy and the principle of presumption of 
innocence.161 As Liberty stresses, the DEA appears to be persisting with two 
alarming tendencies started by the executive. Liberty notes that the first is the 
endeavour to bypass the ordinary rules of civil and criminal practice in favour 
of administrative regulation controlled by the government, which - as this paper 
has demonstrated - violates fundamental rights and undermines due process. 
The second is the decision to leave what needs to be properly addressed through 
primary legislation to secondary legislation, by amending orders which fail to 
attract the expected level of parliamentary scrutiny.162 At a time when Parker J 
himself, in the DEA judicial review decision, recognized that 30.1 million 
adults use the internet daily to learn, send and receive emails, seek employment, 
use online banking, order goods and services, find all sorts of information, and 
entertain themselves;163 it may seem irrational to give power to the private 
sector to control subscribers’ internet connections. However, in my view, the 
existing situation could deteriorate further if under Article 6 of the Convention, 
the DEA subscriber appeal process provisions also violated the right to a fair 
trial. 
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